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Scandinavian countries are known for their universalistic welfare states, corporatist coordination, 
strong economic performances and egalitarian outcomes, an institutional combination often 
referred to as the “The Nordic Model”. However, these countries also possess volatile and 
increasingly vulnerable housing markets characterized by periods of sharp increases in prices and 
rents and some of the highest debt to income ratios in the world. The combination of a 
universalistic welfare state and housing market dynamics sets off a self-reinforcing process of 
increased stratification and re-familialisation. How did these orderly, egalitarian and welfare-
oriented societies end up with housing markets that expose their citizens to increasing risk while 
driving inequality? The key lies in the effect the Nordic welfare state has on financialized 
housing markets. Successful decommodification of human lives leads to generalized 
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Scandinavian countries are known for their universalistic welfare states, corporatist coordination, 
strong economic performances and egalitarian outcomes, an institutional combination often 
referred to as the “The Nordic Model”. However, these countries also possess volatile and 
increasingly vulnerable housing markets characterized by periods of sharp increases in prices and 
rents and some of the highest debt to income ratios in the world. The interaction effect created 
when Nordic style generalized creditworthiness meets a financialised housing market sets off a 
process of increased stratification and re-familialisation. How did these orderly, egalitarian and 
welfare-oriented societies end up with housing markets that expose their citizens to increasing 
risk while driving inequality? This paper lays out the sequence of mechanisms set in motion by 
the combination of generalized creditworthiness and financialisation.   
 
Success attracts attention. Comparative Political Economy is often more concerned with superior 
performance and positive reinforcement than negative spirals towards dynamic disequilibria. In 
fact, the discipline has been marked by a faddish tendency to focus scholarly attention towards a 
succession of what may be termed supermodels (Schwartz and Tranøy 2019). Influential 
thinking about the “Nordic model” takes a similar hue. It celebrates these models’ ability to 
combine desirable traits like welfare, equality, growth, export performance, fertility and female 
participation rates. The main theoretical orientation is institutional complementarities.  
 
By contrast, our story highlights negative interaction effects between the institutions that regulate 
the markets for housing and credit. Their interaction sets off potentially self-reinforcing 
processes whose outcomes are paradoxical and run against welfare policy goals. Both credit and 
housing have been liberalised in Scandinavia over the last three decades. By liberalisation we 
mean that regulations are made more market-friendly, so that the general tendency is for an 
increasing amount of the housing stock to be sold or rented at market or near market prices. 
Credit market liberalisation was often quite dramatic and fairly easy to handle conceptually: 
regulations limiting who gets credit and determining at what terms and for which purpose were 
removed. Housing market liberalisation is less straight forward. Institutional variation is 
considerable, and the process of liberalisation has been more gradual, indeed creeping in some 
instances (Tranøy 2000). Still, both credit and housing markets have moved in the same 
direction. Historically, the three Scandinavian countries have a myriad of ownership, quasi-
ownership and rental forms. Liberalisation has shifted them towards homeownership as a goal, 
with their rental markets becoming more residual and more expensive.  
 
These liberalisations combined with the long period of low interest rates to increasingly 
financialise Scandinavian housing. Indeed, the emerging literature on the financialisation of 
housing sees housing not simply as another expression of the broader trend of financialisation, 
but rather as one of financialisation’s central drivers (Aalbers 2016). This is because housing has 
become one of the most important collateral assets for global financial markets. This means, 
among other things, that housing is increasingly judged by its market value and seen as an asset 
class and an investment opportunity. The consumption motive, though still dominant 
numerically, is thus joined and impacted by individuals pursuing an investment motive. We can 
thus say that the liberalisation of housing, credit (and cross border capital) contributes to an 
increasing commodification and financialisation of housing. We see the social consequences of 
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rapid price increases in that Norway’s largest bank now reports that 7 out of 10 first-time buyers 
are helped into the market by “the bank of mum and dad” (Solvang 2019) and in incessant dinner 
party conversations among middle aged and upper middle-class people on buying a second and 
third flat for investment purposes.    
 
These developments are interesting to comparative political economy for at least three reasons: 
Firstly, at least since Peter Katzenstein’s (1984) work on corporatism and welfare in small open 
economies, it has been common to emphasize virtuous cycles and complementarities between 
economic and welfare policies. One example is how female labour market participation in caring 
professions creates room for other women to leave home for work, simultaneously increasing 
household incomes and tax revenues that finance that welfare (Barth, Moene and Wallerstein 
2003). Another is the positive feedback loop between high quality institutions and social capital 
(Rothstein and Uslaner 2006). Similarly, and more formalized, comparative political economy in 
its dominant, Varieties of Capitalism-strand has been centred on the positive effects of 
complementarities between interlocking institutions (Hall and Soskice 2001; Amable 2016).  
 
What we might call the housing paradox – and this is our second point of interest – is that 
housing prices in Scandinavia have been rising dramatically over the past two decades, 
seemingly despite egalitarianism, interventionist traditions and strong welfare states. House price 
increases have far outpaced wage growth even though middle-class wages – unlike in many other 
industrialized countries – have not stagnated and income inequality, though rising, remains 
comparatively low. The Nordic countries now have some of the highest household debt-to-
income ratios in the world, with most of that debt housing related. 
 
Our third point of interest is a welfare paradox. The interaction effects between housing and 
credit have produced endogenous decay in terms of welfare outcomes, i.e. increased stratification 
and re-familialisation. In 2018 Sweden ranked third in the world on housing unaffordability 
measured by the price to income ratio (IMF Global Housing Watch 2018). In terms of median 
rent costs as percentage of disposable income, Norway ranked first among OECD countries 
(OECD 2018a). In all three countries, young home-buyers increasingly have to rely on “the bank 
of mum and dad” in order to step onto the property ladder, despite living in the very countries 
that are supposed to provide equality of opportunity. With high housing prices, the value of the 
property you may inherit when your parents die becomes a significant factor for the wealth you 
are able to accumulate in your lifetime. As house price increases are far greater in urban areas 
than in rural areas, the value of inherited property will increase geographical differences in 
wealth. Piketty’s (2014) argument that inheritance will become more important as predictor of 
economic welfare in the 21st century looks like it may come to apply in Scandinavia as well. 
Housing, which was once a central pillar of the social democratic project, has broken almost 
entirely free from the broader Scandinavian welfare state. 
  
What mechanisms link these famously equal societies with high debt levels and increasing 
housing inequality? Arguably, no other market discriminates as strongly on income and wealth 
differentials as the credit market, where both present and future income and wealth are taken into 
account when financial institutions grant loans. But the generous welfare state, coordinated wage 
bargaining, labour market regulations and the pooling of risk that constitute the Nordic model 
make large parts of the population creditworthy borrowers compared to other societies. This 
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generalised creditworthiness combines with favourable tax regimes to drive growth in mortgage 
debt and housing prices. Put simply, a generous and universal welfare state characterized by a 
relatively equal income distribution creates a large pool of creditworthy potential buyers whose 
income, pension and healthcare security makes them willing and able to take on quite high debt 
levels. The demand for homeownership creates a vicious cycle of rising prices financed by ever 
larger mortgages. 
 
The next section speaks briefly to some of the literature that has explored linkages between 
welfare and housing policies. Section three follows the historical trajectory of residential 
capitalism in the three Scandinavian countries, highlighting some of the differences between 
their respective housing markets before and after liberalisation. While Norwegian housing 
markets have been fully liberalised, both Sweden and Denmark retain a substantial non-private 
rental sector. These have been partially liberalised in recent decades and now have an uneasy 
coexistence with the broader housing market. Section four discusses the implication of these 
changes, by looking at how current trends in housing might drive a wedge in the broader social 
democratic project. Section five concludes. 
 
2.0 Welfare states and housing 
Housing sits rather uneasily in the broader literature on welfare states – and housing has been 
called everything from “the wobbly pillar” (Torgersen 1987) of the social democratic welfare 
state to the “cornerstone” of asset-based welfare (Malpass 2007). It is a sector that is never fully 
public but also never fully private, and frequently cuts across the conventional ideal type 
political economies, such as coordinated and liberal market economies (Schwartz and Seabrooke 
2009). As a topic is has largely been neglected in the broader field of political economy (Aalbers 
and Christophers 2014; Johnston and Kurzer 2019, this issue). We are interested in the complex 
ways in which a housing system is both part of a broader policy regime, and how housing may 
affect that same policy regime when credit and housing markets are liberalised. 
 
2.1. Welfare states and housing as a trade-off 
A classic concern in the housing literature that emerged from the early 80s and into the 90s is the 
effect of housing policies and home ownership on political support for, and the development of, 
the welfare state (Kemeny 1980; Esping Andersen 1986; Castles 1998; Kemeny 2005, Stamsø 
2010; Ansell 2014). This strand of research argues that holding a large asset like a home usually 
is relative to income and other assets, will reduce a voter’s disposition to support welfare related 
taxes. The posited mechanisms vary from negativity towards higher taxes particularly in the 
early (and expensive) stage of the life cycle (Kemeny 1980) to the narrower argument that 
income from owner occupancy reduces support for public pensions (Castles 1998) to the twist 
that the link between support for right-of-centre welfare policies and homeownership only holds 
when rising housing prices increase the owner-occupants’ ability to hedge against other forms of 
life-risk (Ansell 2014). Van Gunten and Kohl (2019, this issue) find that the negative 
relationship between home-ownership and support for redistribution is only found in the data up 
to the 1980s, then the relationship turns neutral, and is actually positive in most countries today. 
 
These significant differences notwithstanding, the causal chain suggested by all three is still one 
that runs from homeownership as an asset, to electoral support for the welfare state. In contrast, 
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2.2. Welfare states and housing: reversing the logic 
Thus, it can be said that we reverse the logic of the original literature when we look at how the 
welfare state shapes housing policy and market developments. In Scandinavia, the welfare state 
has affected increasingly liberal housing markets by creating a steady supply of creditworthy 
borrowers. In turn, this supply of borrowers is generating increasingly unequal housing 
outcomes, in a process of stratification and familialisation that runs directly counter to the 
ideological underpinnings and aims of the Scandinavian welfare states. We look first at the 
decommodifying policy regime that emerged in the post-war decades, and then at what happened 
when highly liberalised housing finance systems are introduced to relatively egalitarian societies. 
 
One advantage of our comparison is that it shows that a strategy of owner-occupancy can be 
aligned with a redistributive, decommodifying political strategy. This was possible in a policy 
environment that limited profit-taking in both housing and credit markets, Second, this gives us a 
point of departure for thinking about what happens when these limits no longer hold. What 
happens in societies that collectivize risk and distribute income and therefore also 
creditworthiness relatively equally when they confront a world of sustained low interest rates and 
large amounts of capital seeking investment opportunities?  
 
2.3. Equality as a driver of inequality - The dynamics of liberalised housing in 
Scandinavia 
Liberalised housing is beginning to create inequality dynamics in the Scandinavian countries. 
This section seeks to tease out the potentially dangerous dynamics that are triggered when you 
introduce liberalised credit markets into relatively equal societies. We present a stylised model of 
the mechanisms that link egalitarian welfare, credit markets and unequal housing while 
connecting these mechanisms to the broad macro trends - rising house prices and price/incomes 
ratios, and the rise of familial help for the young entering the market.  
 
Three features of the Nordic welfare state help produce creditworthy borrowers. First, a high 
degree of income equality shrinks the ‘bad credit’ tail of the distribution. Secondly, high 
replacement ratios and extensive social insurance mean that unemployment, health problems or 
retirement will not reduce an individual’s ability to repay a mortgage to the same extent it does 
in other countries. Finally, the Nordic welfare state includes high female labour force 
participation as one of its key features, and two-income families are more creditworthy 
borrowers. 
 
While unregulated credit markets are in essence the markets that most brutally discriminate on 
economic terms, there was less to discriminate on in the Scandinavian countries compared to 
other states. Broad swaths of the population had decent and, importantly, similar incomes and 
extensive social insurance through the welfare state. This made them attractive borrowers. As a 
consequence, the majority of home-buyers in Scandinavia were “chasing the same housing” and 




However, once liberal credit and housing markets are introduced, this changes. While credit 
markets have less to discriminate over in societies that enjoy a high degree of income equality 
and social protection programs, the non-trivial differences that do exist are accentuated and 
propelled by liberalisation. 
 
Rising house prices and debt levels encourages higher risk-taking and speculation, but all 
speculation is not the same. It may be useful to distinguish between defensive and offensive 
speculation (Tranøy 2009). Imagine two stylised or ideal-type buyers. The first-time buyer might 
be afraid that if she delays her entry onto the housing ladder, house prices will only have risen 
even more, and it will be even harder to climb on. She thus accepts a higher price and debt level 
than she may be comfortable with, gambling that house prices will keep rising and interest rates 
will remain low. She would be a defensive speculator. An offensive speculator is someone who 
is not looking to buy a primary dwelling, but instead wants to reap profits from rising house 
prices, either through short-term flipping or as a longer term buy-to-let investment. 
 
Rising house prices thus hit different parts of the population differently. Both types of 
speculation push up prices and debt levels, but they emerge from different motivations and have 
different implications for those concerned.1 As house prices continue to rise faster than wages, 
inequality dynamics are set in motion. Two fault-lines are deepened in this process. The first is 
generational, between older haves and younger have-nots. This in turn increases the demand for 
help from “The Bank of Mom and Dad” (BoMad). The second fault line is geographical. 
Financialisation and urbanisation may not be causally linked, but they are running in tandem, 
widening the price gap between urban and non-urban property. The most pronounced difference 
thus appears between those seeking entry into urban markets with and without parents possessing 
urban housing capital.    
 
Scandinavian countries have traditionally had the sets of policies that make it easier for the 
young to leave the parental home early (Flynn 2019, this issue). However, the first-time buyer 
may now find it more and more difficult to get on the property ladder. Even on a median income, 
a single person household can today find it difficult to buy even a small apartment in one of the 
three Nordic capitals without parental help. Those at the top of the income distribution, who 
already own their primary dwelling, will increasingly see property as an attractive investment 
and an important part of their asset portfolio (along with stocks and bonds). When this is 
investment in residential property, we can expect a growth in the buy-to-let market, and a higher 
proportion of landlords owning more than one property.  
 
These dynamics will also impact the renter. Even if the relative proportion of owner-occupiers to 
renters were to remain the same, rising house prices in general, and the increase of the buy-to-let 
market in particular, may drive rents up, as has been the case in Norway. Thus, the poor and the 
young who were renters even under the old regime will now have to pay more. Rising prices that 
increase the differential between subsidized/social housing and market prices tend to put upward 
pressure on more decommodified institutional arrangements. Another effect of price increases is 
that both renters and buyers in the lower parts of the income distribution may be driven out of 
central urban areas. They will have little chance of buying, and no longer even be able to rent in 
 
1 Both groups take on increased risk, but defensive speculators have less margin of error and risk losing more if 
markets turn or life events like unemployment, disability, death or divorce force them to reprioritize. 
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the cities in which they work and study, but instead be “forced commuters” of the kind we see in 
much larger cities elsewhere in the world, and in countries that have higher income inequality.  
 
All three countries’ tax regimes favour homeownership. The favourable taxation of housing 
compared to other assets makes housing a more attractive investment. These taxation policies 
were introduced under a different policy regime, when housing and credit markets were better 
regulated, and part of the national housing policy efforts towards expanding homeownership 
(primarily in Norway) and securing affordable housing. While other regulations have been 
removed, the favourable tax treatment of mortgages and housing have to a large extent remained, 
and property taxes in all three countries are far below the OECD average.2 This gives large 
advantages to homeowners, and to those investors buying to let. This system has regressive 
effects as higher income groups get higher tax deductions, and there are no deductions for 
renting.  
 
3.0 The Scandinavian housing markets – a brief historical overview 
In the literature on the Nordic model, housing rarely features centrally, with Esping-Andersen 
(1985) as a notable exception. The omission of housing is perhaps not surprising, as one would 
be hard-pressed to identify a distinct Nordic or Scandinavian model of housing. Housing was a 
central part of the broader social democratic project in all Scandinavian countries. Yet, the 
housing policies differed to an extent that a specific “Nordic model of housing” cannot be 
identified (Bengtsson 2006; Ruonavaara 2012). What the Scandinavian housing systems did have 
in common when the post-war welfare systems were developed was a view of decent housing as 
a social right (rather than as an investment asset), and a general scepticism toward the private 
rental market.  
 
In this section we very briefly introduce some aspects of Scandinavian housing systems, both 
under the more decommodified period, and after liberalisation. We shall see that despite 
persisting differences in the tenure distribution of these three housing systems, the combination 
of a strong welfare state and financialised housing markets have produced similar outcomes in 
terms of increased unaffordability of homeownership (rising price/income ratios), increased 
indebtedness, and an increase in the use of bank of mum and dad.  
 
3.1 Differences in decommodified housing in Scandinavia 
Decommodified housing, as a stylized model, has two key dimensions. First, the relationship 
between income or wealth and the ability to own your own home is weakened as housing 
resources are distributed in a more equitable way than would be the case in a more commodified 
market. Second, stable price growth reduces both risks and potential for windfall profits. The 
 
2 In Denmark, almost all interest expenditure is tax deductible at a value that reduces the cost by one third. (Danske 
Bank Markets, 2018). In Norway, 25 % of interest expenditures has been tax deductible (as of 2018, it is 23 %). 
There is no limit on the value of the deduction. In Sweden, 30 % of interest expenditures is tax deductible up to SEK 
100.000, and 21 % on costs exceeding SEK 100.000. In Sweden there is 22% tax on any capital gain from selling 
your home, whilst in Denmark and Norway this is not taxed at all, as long as the property sold has been your main 
residence for a minimum period (Nordea Markets, 2017). On property tax: In 2017 the tax amounted to 1,0 % of 
GDP in Sweden, 1,3 % in Norway and 1,8 % in Denmark, compare to 4,2 % UK and US (OECD 2018d) 
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sum of regulations and other interventions in the market have the effect of controlling price 
development in a way a less regulated market does not.  
 
In the post-war decades, housing policy was an integral part of the broader Scandinavian social 
democratic project. Housing was seen first and foremost as a social right, provided through a 
high degree of state intervention in markets, in the form of regulation of rents and house prices, 
subsidies for renters and homeowners, land allocation, regulation of credit and bond markets, and 
comprehensive universal welfare benefits. There were housing shortages, especially in urban 
areas, and policy was geared toward construction of new housing. Among these policies were 
subsidies public provision of lots and infrastructure, cheap credit directed at housing and 
generous tax breaks. Subsidies and regulation of housing targeted both the demand (credit 
controls) and the supply side (price and land allocation). 
 
In Norway, then as now, homeownership was the ideal, either in the form of freeholding or 
tenant-ownership/co-operatives. One of the reasons why homeownership is more common in 
Norway than in the rest of Scandinavia is that urbanisation occurred later there, and homeowners 
received generous and universal subsidies through tax subsidies, mortgages, grants, and low 
interest loans. In 1946, the government established a state bank for housing, Husbanken. Loans 
and grants from Husbanken were not means-tested but given to all housing projects that 
conformed to established criteria. Construction of housing was strictly regulated in terms of 
requirements for size, access to natural light, views from windows and so forth. During the peak 
in the 1970s, Husbanken funded around 70 % of all single home construction projects (compared 
to around 15-20 % today).3 An organisation for co-op housing was also created. The co-op 
sector, borettslag, became an important tool for providing affordable housing in urban areas. 
This tenure form received generous subsidies both when acquiring plots and through cheap 
credit. In order to pass subsidies on to the next buyer, the re-sale price of borettslag-apartments 
were also regulated. This was done in order to pass on the subsidies to the next buyer. The 
Norwegian government owned few residential properties outright, and the public rental sector 
was small and primarily residual compared to Sweden and Denmark that developed large public 
or quasi-public rental sectors with universalistic aims (Stamsø 2009). 
  
In Sweden, the housing shortage posed an even greater challenge. The Social Democrats rolled 
out the famous “Million homes program” between 1964-1973. It aimed to build one million 
homes in a country which then had a population of eight million. Sweden’s housing policy was 
much less geared toward homeownership, and instead pursued a policy of tenure neutrality 
between public rentals, co-operatives and freeholding. The Swedish form of co-op housing, 
bostadsrätt, was similar to the Norwegian one. They were subsidised on one end, and price 
regulated at the other end when apartments were sold to new tenant-owners. Like Norway, large 
national organisations that became important players in housing policy represented the interests 
of Swedish co-op tenants. Unlike Norway, Sweden created a large public rental sector, 
Allmännyttan, that was explicitly designed as a tenure form available to all Swedes, irrespective 
of income. This universalistic feature means that this public rental sector was very different from 
the means-tested social housing sectors in other countries.4 Allmännyttan typically consisted of 
 
3 https://husbanken.no/om-husbanken/historikk/.  
4 This sector is sometimes labeled “social housing” in the literature, although with its universalistic aim it is very 
different from, say, council housing in the UK. An illustration of the labeling problem with this sector is illustrated 
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multi-story buildings owned by municipalities and managed through municipal housing 
corporations and offered decent housing at rents below market price in most cases. Sweden also 
retained a considerable private rental sector, but it took a corporatist form. Rents were to be 
negotiated through local “rent panels”, and not in the market. General rent levels for social 
housing sector were negotiated at the national level, with representatives from the Swedish 
Tenants Union and the municipal housing companies, and representatives of private landlords 
determining reference rents. Swedish housing policy was thus embedded in civil society in a way 
that was rather unique in an international context (Ruonavaara 2012). In practice, the negotiated 
private rental markets did not always work as intended, with an emergent “black market” for 
renting. 
 
Denmark, like Sweden, did not push homeownership to the same degree as Norway. Denmark 
also has a cooperative or tenant-owned housing sector, but this part of the housing sector is small 
compared to both Sweden and Norway’s and concentrated mainly in Copenhagen (7 % 
nationally, and 35 % of dwellings in the capital). Denmark also established a large non-private 
rental sector, but this took a different form than Sweden’s. The housing was not owned by the 
municipalities in Denmark, but instead by non-profit housing associations that were regulated 
and subsidized by the government. There were also rent controls in the private market for some 
of the housing stock. The homeownership rate in Denmark was, and still is, the lowest of the 
three countries, despite Denmark having the largest mortgage market/GDP ratio. Denmark’s 
mortgage system is also very different from that of its neighbours. Quasi-public financial 
institutions that issue covered bonds securitize Danish mortgages. This system pre-dates the roll 
out of the welfare state. The right to securitize mortgages was given only to a handful these 
realkredit institutions, the oldest of which dates back to the 18th century (Schwartz 2019, this 
issue).  
 
Figure 1 approx here (see last pages of this document) 
 
 
3.2 Liberalisation hits Scandinavia – Reforms of housing, credit and taxation 
Beginning in the 1980s, right-wing governments in all three countries liberalised housing 
markets as part of their broader liberalisation and privatisation projects, and these changes were 
mostly not reversed under subsequent left-wing governments. Sweden has switched from a 
policy of tenure neutrality to that of promoting homeownership (Christophers 2013). While 
supply side subsidies (‘bricks and mortar’) are all but gone in all three countries, demand 
subsidies remain in the form of a means-tested housing allowance and very favourable tax 
treatment of mortgage debt. Denmark and Sweden have nominally retained their large non-
private rental sectors, although these have been liberalised. All countries have experienced 
rapidly rising home prices (Figure 1), increased debt levels (Figure 2) and increased price to 
income ratios (Figure 3). 
  









Rent controls were gradually loosened and finally abolished in 2000.5 Price controls for sales in 
the co-operative sector were removed, and those who had obtained such apartments during the 
de-commodified period were able to turn around and make large windfall profits by selling at 
market prices. As a result, prices for these co-op apartments are now more or less the same as for 
comparable freeholder properties. Since liberalisation, home prices have risen dramatically, 
especially in urban areas. Yet, homeownership rates have not declined as a result, and even 
increased slightly. The average age of first-time buyers in Norway has declined slightly over the 
past two decades (Finanstilsynet 2017), in contrast to the “Generation Rent” trends we can see in 
countries like the UK. Household debt to income levels have grown considerably.  
 
A much larger portion of first-time buyers now report getting help from their parents than was 
the case fifteen years ago (Finanstilsynet 2017). Data from Statistics Norway show that half of 
buyers in their 20s received family help in the period 2010-2015, and 40 % of those in their 30s 
(Gram Dokka 2018). Norway’s largest bank, DNB, reported that 70 % of their mortgage 
customers aged 18-33 received parental help in 2018, and the bank sees that trend as rising 
further in 2019 (Solvang 2019). Receiving help from parents when buying a home is associated 
with lower loan-to-value ratios and with higher property values (Halvorsen and Lindquist 2017). 
This suggests that while young people without access to parental wealth are still getting on the 
housing ladder, they are doing so with more debt and for less valuable housing than their more 
privileged peers. 
 
In recent years, authorities have attempted to put a brake on the housing boom by introducing 
minimum down payment requirements and maximum loan-to-income ratios, though this has yet 
to curb the boom. As for offensive speculation, more households are investing in property 
markets, with 10 % of Norwegian households now owning a second property (Løyland Omholt 
2018). To halt the increasing buy-to-let phenomenon in Oslo (the offensive speculation), the 
right-wing government in 2017 instituted a 40 % down-payment requirement for this type of 
purchase in Oslo, as well as less favourable tax treatment for mortgages for buy-to-let nationally.  
 
Figure 3 approx here (see last pages of this document) 
 
Sweden 
In Sweden, liberalisation has gradually replaced the policy of tenure neutrality by promoting and 
privileging homeownership. Some elements of the old regime still remain. Christophers (2013) 
calls these ‘islands of regulation’ in an otherwise liberalised market, creating a “monstrous 
hybrid” of a housing policy.  
 
The homeownership rate in Sweden has increased over this period. The proportion of freeholders 
has remained stable, and the tenure change comes from a decline in the proportion of public 
rental housing and a proportional rise in co-op housing. Sweden has pursued its own variant of 
Thatcher’s “Right to buy” policy. Beginning in the early 1990s, tenants of public housing were 
invited to convert their rented apartments to tenant-ownerships at a price 40-60 % below market 
price. The new homeowners could then turn around and sell these apartments in the market and 
 
5 Rents in private rental are now market rents, and rents in the small social sector are determined from averages of 
nearby comparable dwellings and are close to market rates. 
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reap windfall profits. At first this policy was introduced by the Social Democrats in Stockholm, 
but they did not actually start selling off property before Moderaterna won the city in the 1991 
election. Since then, the Social Democrats have opposed and Moderaterna have supported this 
selling off-policy. After a bout of selling under Moderaterna in Stockholm in 1998 the issue 
garnered national political attention. The Social Democrats in Riksdagen passed a “Stop Law” 
that allowed the central government to withhold financial support to municipalities that were 
selling off property. This law did not entirely stop the selling, however. Christophers (2013: 892) 
estimates that between 2000 and 2009, the conversion of 30 000 municipal apartments in 
Stockholm to co-op apartments entailed a wealth transfer of 50bn SEK from the Stockholm 
taxpayer to these 30 000 new homeowners. In Stockholm, the selling was stopped under Social 
Democratic rule in 2014, and the topic of selling allmänyttan-apartments remains an issue that 
divides the Social Democrats and Moderaterna today (Svenska Bostäder 2018; 
Socialdemokraterna 2018).  
 
Swedish municipalities still own approximately 20 % of the country’s housing stock, constituting 
half of the rental sector (see table 1 for tenure distribution). Through liberalisation the 
municipalities have sold off the most attractive part of their housing stock, illustrating the 
pressures that social housing programs come under when housing becomes an increasingly 
valuable market asset. 
 
Government budgets clearly show the shift in Swedish housing policy: In the late 1980s housing 
was a net cost for the government of around 25-35 billion SEK annually. A decade later housing 
provided a net income of 31 billion SEK (Christophers 2013: 896). Parental help is now more 
common among young homebuyers, and parental wealth has become an important predictor of 
tenure form for young people in Sweden (Öst 2012). Survey indicate large increase in the use of 
BoMad among young home-buyers, with 23 % stating they received parental help in 2017, up 
from 13 % in 2009. If we add those that stated they used an inheritance not from their parents 
(from grandparents or others) to buy, we have a third of homeowners stating they received 
familial help to buy a home (SBAB 2017). These data do not include those whose parents 
guaranteed their mortgages, yet data from Norway suggests this is an important form of familial 
help (Gram Dokka 2018).  
 
Table 1 approximately here. (see last pages of this document) 
 
Denmark 
Danish housing markets have also been liberalised over the past thirty years, but without any 
major changes in tenure distribution. The opposition successfully stopped attempts by right-wing 
governments to fully privatize the non-private rental sector, although more moderate reform 
proposals subsequently passed (Christophers 2013). Denmark has long had a corporatist housing 
system that does not promote private landlords. While a private individual landlord faced a tax of 
28 % on rental income, a pension fund owning property was only taxed 15 % (Mortensen and 
Seabrooke 2009). Denmark has had a modest increase in homeownership overall, yet 
significantly, homeownership among the young in the bottom of the income distribution has 
declined. In 1985, 55 % of young adults in the lowest income quartile owned their own homes. 
In 2006 that proportion had dropped to 21 % (Nielsen and Jensen 2011). In the same period the 
homeownership rate among the same age cohort in the top quartile of the income distribution 
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remained roughly the same (65 vs. 62 %). Denmark is unusual in that it has a low 
homeownership rate compared to other countries yet has the highest mortgage debt to income 
ratios in the world. As Bohle and Seabrooke write (2019, this issue), homeownership in 
Denmark remains a firmly middle-class affair. This distribution of mortgage debt complicates 
the more alarmist interpretations of the high household debt levels in Denmark. 
 
In Denmark, the use of BoMaD, has also grown in recent decades.  The most common form of 
help is parents buying flats outright for their children, forældrekøb. Here, parents buy (typically) 
an apartment for their child to live in while at university, and in many cases the child pays a 
below market “rent” to her parents. After some years the ownership of the apartment is often 
transferred to the child as a family gift, which is taxed at a considerably lower rate than capital 
gains generally. In the larger cities of Denmark, forældrekøb is a considerable phenomenon. In 
2011, 20 % of apartment purchases in Copenhagen were forældrekøb (Valgreen-Voigt 2018). 
After new mortgage rules were introduced in 2015, this phenomenon slackened somewhat but is 
still considerable. Forældrekøb today makes up almost half of smaller apartment sales in urban 
areas (Danske Bank 2019). Of course, not all parents can buy homes from their children, and 
data shows that those who do forældrekøb are predominantly white Danes with average income 
and wealth twice the national average (DST 2016). Over time, these dynamics are likely to 
increase stratification in Danish housing and is a sign of increasing familialisation.  
 
 
4.0 The problem of Scandinavian housing – equality driving inequality? 
Many industrialized countries are in a housing crisis, as rising prices and rents coincide with 
stagnant or declining incomes and reduced public benefits. None of the Scandinavian countries 
share this predicament. This does not mean that their housing systems are not the source of 
problems, or that these problems do not pose a threat to their broader political economies.  
 
While wages have been rising across the income distribution, housing prices have been rising 
even more. Sweden ranked third globally on price-to-income ratio in 2018. Norway ranked 9th, 
and Denmark 19th (having come down following their housing bust in 2009). Increased 
unaffordability has not yet caused a decline in homeownership, but an increase in debt and in the 
reliance on parental help. The Norwegian case suggests that homebuyers with parental help enter 
the market with less debt and for more valuable housing than those without. For those renting, 
rents are high. In 2018 Norway ranked first on rental unaffordability (median rents as percentage 
of disposable income) in the OECD. Sweden was fourth and Denmark ninth (OECD 2018a). 
 
Scandinavian countries all have relatively low levels of income inequality6, although these have 
been rising in recent years, particularly in Sweden. Financialised housing markets are seen as one 
of the drivers of this rise in inequality (Belfrage and Kallifatides 2017). While data on wealth 
inequality is harder to come by, and statistical agencies in Scandinavia have only recently begun 
publishing such data, we know that wealth inequality is much higher than income inequality in 
Scandinavia, and more in line with inequality levels seen in other countries (Aaberge 2018). If 
the trends we have outlined continue, we can expect this wealth inequality to increase, and the 
 
6 In 2015 Norway had an income GINI of 27.5, Sweden 29.2 and Denmark 28.2 (Data from OECD). 
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importance of inheritance along with it. As prices in the three capitals and other major cities 
continue to grow faster than national averages, there will also be an increasing urban-rural divide 
in the value of inheriting family property.7 The compound effect of these two phenomena being 
felt by many of the often well-educated young people from rural areas who are trying to settle in 
major cities, thus potentially negatively affecting the social mobility for which the Scandinavian 
countries are known. 
 
Re-familialisation in housing markets is a clear trend in OECD countries (Flynn and Schwartz 
2018). That this is also happening in Scandinavia, despite remaining social protections and 
relative income inequality, represents something of a paradox. We have argued that the sources 
of these dynamics are found in the interaction of the generalized creditworthiness that these 
welfare states give their citizens, with the price and debt dynamics that liberalised housing 
markets tend to create. Increased housing unaffordability, rising debt levels, and the reinforcing 
inequalities that come from the use of bank of mum and dad may over time come to form an 
existential threat to the Nordic model.  
 
5.0 Conclusions 
A bird’s eye view of the Scandinavian countries gives us a picture of three welfare states that 
still decommodify human lives with respect to pensions, health, life risks in general and 
education, but no longer when it comes to housing. While these countries remain different in 
terms of tenure composition, they are experiencing a similar set of problems in their housing 
markets. 
 
One of the key concerns of this article is what happens when these institutional spheres – income 
equalizing policies and liberalized housing market policies – interact. Rather than take 
homeownership rates as given and examine their effects on voter preferences, our approach has 
been to look at the welfare state systems that produced these original housing systems. We have 
seen how original decommodification policies (tax treatment of mortgage debt and low interest 
rates) have affected housing outcomes and produced policy drift in more liberal credit and 
housing markets. When a still functioning universalistic welfare state meets liberalised housing, 
it helps drive credit growth through the mechanism of generalized creditworthiness. The 
interaction of the creditworthiness and the willingness to take risk that a generous welfare state 
enables provides extra fuel for housing booms. This in turn has consequences for both 
distribution and financial risk, at the individual level and for the system as such.  
 
In terms of distribution we see increased cleavages between and within generations as housing 
affordability is reduced and the significance of inheritance and parental help increases. 
Meanwhile risk is increased at the micro level for households that feel compelled to engage in 
defensive speculation. In terms of stability at the macro level, risk increases as debt grows faster 
than income. As these countries still differ in homeownership rates, and whether or not they have 
a non-private rental sector, differences in how these mechanisms play out on the ground are 
worth investigating. Still, a common trend towards increased inequality in the distribution of 
 
7 At the end of 2018, both Copenhagen and Stockholm prices per m2 were 1.5 times the national average, while 
Oslo’s were 1.7 national average (Data from Boligsiden DK, Svensk Mäklarstatistik and Eiendom Norge, all 2019)  
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renting opportunities, wealth and risk, re-familialisation and recommodification are sufficiently 
strong to merit our attention.  
 
It’s not that Governments in Scandinavia are unconcerned with rising home prices and increasing 
debt levels. The issue is more if their approaches and understandings are encompassing enough 
to be able to address the problems we have highlighted here. Norway and Sweden have both 
tightened lending requirements in an attempt to slow their housing booms, while the financial 
crisis temporarily took care of Denmark’s. As tightening the credit market might 
disproportionately harm those young buyers without access to family wealth, Scandinavian 
governments will increasingly have a hard time balancing macro concerns with the housing 
market with ideals of equality of access to homeownership. When and if the era of low interest 
rates comes to an end, many households may confront much higher housing-related costs. In a 
worst-case scenario this could lead to a full-blown crisis. Even a more moderate scenario would 
entail significantly reduced aggregate demand and therefore growth and employment, and 
ultimately the sustainability of the welfare state.   
 
Our argument is built upon a paradox, we claim that equality can drive inequality. Logically, this 
raises the question if increased inequality over time can kill off the mechanisms we have 
depicted. This could conceivably happen if inequality produced reduced housing prices and 
redistributed wealth back to those who are missing out now. Housing prices may well fall at 
some point, but we do not find the second part of that scenario convincing. If a crash or a strong 
“correction” should occur, we need to ask who will be most exposed? Not only wealth, but also 
risk is unevenly distributed. The losers would be the defensive speculators we have described 
and some of the financially less solid offensive speculators. The winners would be the wealthier 
speculators who could expand their portfolios on the cheap and a random cohort of first-time 
buyers who happened to enter the market at the right time. The underlying institutional 
arrangement would not, however, go away. As long as the Nordic Model remains biased towards 
homeownership and continues to produce the kind of equality which facilitates generalized 
creditworthiness, the market would most likely pick up and the housing wealth inequality 
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